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[la,lb] Sales-Warranties-Utility and l'itness.-Wherc n grinding wlH'('1 sold by dd't'Il(hnt Illanuf::ctni't'r to plaintiff's employer was ll1:lIlui'ndnred, ~old [IntI pur~hns('d to be used on a
power driven, high speed, rotating motor, and where it was
known by defendant to be dnngerous if defeetively made or
operated nt "peeds heyond its lllaxill1Ull1 enpacities (which
were Ilut l:wrked on it) and tllnt its ingredients were secret
and knowll only to defcllIlnnt, it was n dangcrous illstrnllH'ntality if containin:! l:ltl'nt dl'fects or if improperly used, :In!1
ill Vil'W 01 modern indnstrinl usage employes should be eOllside['('d mcmhers of the industrial "family" of thl' employer,
whl'ther corporate or private, and thus stand in such privity
to the manufactm·pr to permit an employe, who was injured
when the wheel "bIl'w up" or di~intcgrllted in his face, to
be covcred by warranties made to the purchasrl'-employer.
Such employe has the ~uC'('es~i ve right to po::session and use
of the grinding wheel handed OYer to him hy his employer,
and should fairly be consi.1l'red to be ill }ll'ivity to the v('ndormanufacturer with respect to the implied warranties of fitness
for use and of merchantable quality on which recovery was
sought.
[2] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Matters of Commerce.-It is a
matter of COlllmon knowledge, known to vendor-manufacturers,
that Illost busin(,sH~s arc carried on by means of the assistance
of employes and that equipment or supplies purchased by employers will iu actual use be handled by the employes, who in
this respect may be said to stand in the shoes of thc employer.
[3] Words and Phrases-"Privity."-The term "pl'ivity" appears
to be of uncertnin origin and meaning and to have been developed by the courts nnd applied in Yllrious contl'xts. One
of the customary definitions is that "pl'i"ity" deIlotes llIutulIl
or successi\'e relationship to the same thing or right of propI'rty; it implies sncces!:'ion.
[4] Trial-Instructions-Construction as II Whole.-Instrnetion;;
are to be cOIlsidered as a whole, and in the absence from the

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Salcs, § 117 et seq.; Am.Jur" Sales, § SU
et seq.
[4] Sl'e Cal.Jur.2d, T rial, ~ 16·!; Am.Jur., Trial, § 14:2.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ SnIPs, ~lS3(3); [21 Evi.1encc, §84;
[3] WOl'lls:lIld l'hl'a;;e~; (4] Trial, §lDG(l); [:'i] Xpgligcu(:p, §:2H.

)
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record of the other ill:;truclions :m nppel\ate court i,; i~ nil
position to say that a pnl'ticular instrurtion was or was not
pr('judicial.
[5] Negligence-Appeal-Harnlless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.
-In Iln action for personal injuries sustained by a corporation
employe when an abrasive wheel 1lI:lIlufactured by defendant
and purchased by the corporation "blew up" in the employe's
face while he W:lS using it., the exclusion of evidence of n
statement of opinion by the employer's superintendent concerning whether the employe's glnsses were safety glasses was
not prejudicial where the employe had previously been permitted, over dcfcndant's objection, to testify that the glasses
he was \\'caring nt the time of the accident were safety glasses
"to the best of lI1y knowlcdge," and to give the reasons for that
belief.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arthur Crulll, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed ill part with directions.
Action for damages for personal lllJuries predicated on
alleged negligence of defendant manufacturer and on alleged
breach of implied warranty. Judgment for defendant affirmed with respect to count based on Ilegligeuee, reversed
with respect to warranty COllllt, and cause remanded with
directions.
Robert C. Pannell, LeRoy L. Center and Asher R. Sailors
for Appellant.
lIoss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker
for Respondent.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-In this action to recover for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff as the result of explosion of a
grinding wheel purchased from defelldaut by plaintiff's employer, the trial court snstained without leave to amend a
general demurrer to the count of the ('omplaiut based 011
breach of implied warrallty. Trial was had on the other
(first) count. based on negligcnce, and the jury found for
defendant. Plailltiff appeals from the ensuing judgment for
defendant. 'Ve have concludt'd that plaintiff's contentious of
error in the trial 011 the uegligeu('c COllut are without IIwl'it

June l!JGO)

PETEH,.;O:-; I'. LAMB nt'BIlEH CO.
[;'4 C.2d 339; 5

Ca1.Rptr. 863. 353 P.2d 5751

3-11

but that the j1ll1g"nll'llt should be rcwrsed with respect to the
warranty count.
In Deeember, 1!J54, defendant, a manufacturrr of rubber
bonded abrasives, sold and deliwred to plaintiff's employer,
AiResean,h Manufaduring' Company, a corporation, one hundred rubber bondt'd abrasive wlll'els for use in !!.'rinding and
burring operations. The wheels, two inches ill lliameter, eontained no markiug"s ('ithel' to identify the manufacturer or to
illdieate the maximum revolutions per minute at which the
abrasive wheels could be safely operated. In Jnll<', 1955, while
plaintiff ill connection wit h his elllplo~-l1lent ,,-as using a wheel
which he alll'ges was one of those sold to his employer by
defendant, the wheel" blew up" or disintegrated in his faee
and a portion of the ahrasive imbedded itself in his left eye,
resulting in admittedly serious injury,
lVarrallty COllllt

Plaintiff's first contention on appeal is that the court erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the second eause of action, which
alleged an implied warranty by defendant of fitness for use
and of merchantable quality under the provisions of subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 1735 of the Civil Code,l The
parties agree in their briefs that the only ground upon which
the demurrer could have been sustained is that of lack of
privity of COil tract between plaintiff and defendant manufacturer_
Defendant, rel~-ill~ upon Burr v_ Sherwin Williams
(1954), 42 Ca1.2d 682, 6D5-697 [1!J-23) [268 P .2d 1041], and
Lewis v, TelTY (1896), ]11 Cal. 39 [43 P. 398, 52 Am.St.Rep.
146, 31 hRA_ 220], uri!es that the general rule is that implied warranties, other than ill the sale of food or drugs, extend only to the immediate buyer, and points out that in the
case of many sales, it is contemplated that someone other than
the buyer will use thc goods, although that fact has not generally becn considered to constitute a ground for imposing on
the seller an implied warranty liability to a user who is not a

eo.

lCh-, Colle, ~ 173;" subu. (1): "Where tI,e buyer, expressly or by
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which
the goo(1g are rC'1nin'd, UI1<1 it appear" that the buyer relics on the sellcr's
skill or ,judgment (,,,hether he he the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied Wa!Tllllty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
Bud, pnrpORC."
Sabd. (~): "WII(:l'O the goods arc honght hy description from a seller
who deals in goods of that dc~cri!>tion (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be (.f merchantahle qnn iity_"

)
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purchaser. 1"01' cxample, it was heW in Lewis v. Terry (1896),
that a tellant could lIot recover on implied warranty
against a mllllufadul'l'r-seller for injuries sustaiul'd through
use of a defl·ctive bed, purchased by his landlord. (Of, Dahms
v. General Elevatvl' Co. (1932), 214 Cal. 733,738 [1] [7 P.2d
] 013].) Plaintiff, on the other hand, eonil'lHls that there are
110 California cascs c.lireetly in point involving a fact situation
ill which a rubber bonded abrasive was" purchased and sold
to be used on high speec.l, revolving, power-driven equipment,
a highly dangerous instrumentality," and that the trend today is toward disappearance of the requirement of privity of
contract in cases where it is foreseeable that someone other
than the immediate vendee will be injured by a defective
product. The more recent California cases on the subject, and
those cited or discovered from out of state jurisdictions which
seem in point here, are as follows:
1{[ein v. Duchess Sandw-ich 00., Ltd. (1939),14 Ca1.2d 272,
276-283 [2, 3] [93 P.2d 799] : Plaintiff husband purchased
from a retailer packaged sandwiches manufactured by defendant Duchess Sandwich Company. Plaintiff wife swallowed a bite from one, discovered worms in the remainder of
the sandwich, and became ill. Defendant contended that no
implied warranty existed as to plaintiffs, because of lack of
privity. Tllis court, in reliance upon various out of state cases,
as well as upon other authorities, concluded (p. 282 [2]) that
"the remedies of an injured consumer of unwholesome food
ought 110t to be made to depend 'upon the intricacies of the
Jaw of sales,' and the warranty of the manufacturer to such
consumer should 110t be made to rest solely on 'privity' of
contract," and (p. 283 [3) that "the rulings made in the
authorities herein cited [recognizing an exception to privity
requirements in the case of foodstuffs] are based on sound
principles,-affordillg as they do an adequate remedy for
injuries which may result from the eating of unwholesome
food by an ultimate consumer who, under modern economic
conditions, almost of necessity, must purchase many items of
food prepared in original paekages by the manufacturer and
intended for the consuming public, although marketed
through an intermediate dealer."
Vaccarezza v. Sangllinctti (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 689
[163 P.2d 4701: Plaintiffs hllSb,Ulll aud wife purchasctl salami
froll1 a retailel', ",hiel! had hcen manufaetured by defeudants
Panhwci, et al. '1'he wife and two chi1l1ren ate some of it and
developed triehinosis. Plaintiffs sued bolh retailer and manu-
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facturel', on an illlpli('d warrant,'" of fitlH':;),;. Till' <:Olll·t dcdal'c~
[1] the rule or absolllte liabiliiy l·t'~'ll·,l;(\"s Il~ lH'gligCllcC, ill
implied warranty eaSt'S under scl'l!()n 1,33 o[ the Civil Codc,
and [2J that privity i" not rC(luil'('(1 bL'tln'l'll l'Oll5Uliwr and
manufacturcr whcre foodstuffs are invoIYt~d.
Tre/llc/'oli v. A11stin Trailer Equip. Co. (1951), 102 Cal.
App.~d 464, 417 [227 1'.2,1 023] : Plaintiff surd both retailer
and manufacturer when a so-called fifth wheel (a deviee
which connects and holds together a tractor and sl'mitrailer)
whieh he had purchased from the retailer, broke and caused
plaintiff property damage. Although defendant cites this
ease ill support of the view that privity is required between
eonsnmer and manufacturer to SllppOl·t recovery upon an implied warranty, and although the case did proceed upon that
view, the point does not appear to have been disputed or
argued. 'l'hus, it is related ill the opinion (p. 467) that the
ease was "submitted to the jury, 011 proper instructions which
are not ehallenged," which withdrew il'om the jury the cause
of action against the manufacturer based on warranty, beeause the evidence showed no privity, and submitted only that
based on negligence. The statement on page 477 [9] of the
opinion that the manufacturer's" liability, if any, is dependent on negligence," apparently merely accepts the "unchal- i
lenged" theory of the trial court. Since "Cases are not authority for propositions 110t considered" (People v. Banks
(1959), 53 Cal.2d 370, 389 [1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d
102]), this case would not appear especially helpful to defendant.
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co. (1954), supra, 42 Cal.2d 682,
695-697 [19-23]: Plaintiffs authol'ized one Patton, field man
for Cooperative, to arrange, as per Patton's recommendations, ,
to obtain an inseet spray and hire an aviation company to
apply it to plaintiffs' cotton crop. Patton, with plaintiffs'
approval, engaged defendant Rankin Aviation to do the
spraying. Cooperative delivered t.o Rankin in sealed drums
spray material, which defendant Shcrwin ,\Villiams had manufactured and delivered to Cooperative on consignment. Raukin applied the spray, which damaged plaintiffs' erop. Plaintiffs sued SIH'rwin 'Yilliam:=;, CooperatiYC and nankin, charging
all three with negligence and the first two with breach of
warranty as well. The jury verdict was against Sherwin
Williams, but in favor of the .other defendants. On appeal
Sherwin ,\Villiallls urged, among other things, error in the
instructions .oil illl plied warranties.
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The trial court had im;tmrted (pp. 692, 693) that if there
was an implied warranty Illulcr subdivisions (1) and (2) of
sedioll ]733 of the Civil Code,:! there was no requirement of
privity of contract between the manufacturer and the ultimate
consumer and the manufacturer would be liable, regardless of
lll>gligeuce, for the damage caused hy any breach of this
warranty. III discussing the privity point this court observed
(p. 693 [12) that "the persons to whom the insecticide was
delivcred wcre obviously their [plailltiffs'] agents for purposes of the spraying operation." (Italics added.) And although holding (p. 697 [24]), after discussing the exceptions
with respect to (1) foodstuffs and (2) express warranties by
means of labels or advertising material (pp. 695-697 [19-22]),
that the trial court had erred in instructing that privity was
not required to hold Sherwin Williams on statutory implied
warranties, this court, in reversing the judgment, further declared (p. 697 [23]) that "We need not consider at this time
whether plaintiffs .•. can establish that there was privity
between themselves and Sherwin Williams or that they come
within some exception to the rule." (Italics added.) With
respect to establishing privity, this comment seemingly refers
to the earlier remark that the persons to whom the insecticide
was delivered were obviously plaintiffs' agents. And since the
exceptions to the privity rule had earlier been stated to be
(1) the foodstuff exception which plainly was not involved in
the case, and (2) the express warranty exception, the court's
reference to "some exception," was ch>arly intended to guard
against closing the door to the development of other exceptions
as law and justice and changing economic conditions might
require. As shown by the Duchess Sandwich case (Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd. (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d 272,
276-283 [2, 31. the foodstuff exception was thus developed.
Collum v. Pope If Talbot, Inc. (1955), 135 Ca1.App.2d 653
[288 P.2d 75] : Plaintiff carpenters were injured when a ceiling joist broke under their weight. They sued the dealer who
had sold it to their general contractor employer, and also
sued Pope & Talbot, the lumbcr mill opcrator which had processed and sold the joist to the dealer. The trial court ordered
a nonsuit on the counts predicated on an alleged warranty of
fitness for use. On appeal it was hcld (p. 656) that the lack
of privity was fatal to plain tiffs' claims, although in discussing (p. 657) plaintiffs' "claim that the trend of decision
ill the last 25 years had been to extend the foodstuffs exception
'See footnote I,

)
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to include any 'defectively manufactured product of industry
whidl causes bodily injuries' . . . ," the court pointed out
(pp. 659-660 [1]) that this timber was not "manufactured,"
that any defects in it "'ere as readily apparent to plaintiff
journeymen carpenters, as to mill inspectors, and, further,
that plaintiffs had themsdves signifil'antly changcu this timber by cutting', fitting and nailing it in place to serve as a
ceiling joist. Therefore, said the l'onrt, "we do not feel that
we as an intermediate court of appeal should nndertake to
enunciate and declare the sugge;;tcd extension" of the exception.
In 77 Corpus Juris Secundum 1124, it is declared that
"Although there is some authority to the contrary, it has
been held that privity is not a prerequisite to recovery for
breach of warranty where the subject of the sale which caused
the injury was inherently dangcrous." In support, five cases
are cited: (1) Mazetti v. A.rmour If; CO. (1913), 75 Wash.
622 [135 P. 633, 48 L.RA. XS. 213, Ann. Cas. 1915C 140],
which involved food: the court did, however, declare in its
general discussion, but without citation of authorit~·, that to
the general rule requiring privity "certain exceptions have
been recognized: (1) Where the thing causing the injury is
of a noxious or dangerous kind . . . . " (P. 634 [1] of 135 P.)
(2) Fleenor v. Erickson (1950), 35 "\Yn.2d 891 [215 P.2d
885], in which plaintiffs sought to recoycr damages suffered
when their refrigerator locker plant in the basement of their
store building froze the ground beneath, causing the building
to buckle and necessitating the closing of the plant. After
citing and quoting from the Mazetti case certain exceptions
to the privity rule, including that ""~here the thing causing
the injury is of a noxious or dangerous kind" (p. 889 [3]
[215 P.2d ]), the court held that because of lack of privity
plaintiffs could not recover on warranty from the manufacturer of the insulating material useu in installing the locker
plant.
(3) Williams v. S. H. Kress &; Company (195:'5),48 Wn.2d
88 [291 P.2d 662], in which plaintiff consumer surd a manufacturer for damagc allegedly resulting' from thr use of antiseptic as a mouthwash. After again eitillg and quoting (p.
664 [1, 2] [291 P.2d]) the exceptions mentionrd in the
Mazetti case, the court in this third case from "\Vashington
held (p. 665 [3] [291 P,2d]) that breause the pUl'ehaser had
not made known to the retailer that she wished a mouthwash,
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anu the antiseptic was 1I0t so lah('11'(1, there was no illlpliell '
\rarranty of fitness.
( 4) Worley v. Procl er d'; Gam ole Mfg. Co. (1952), 241 Mo.
App. 1114 [253 S.\Y.:?d 532], in which the ultilllate consnmer
of a detergent whith alll'gedly resulted in skin injuri('s had
relied on advertising' labels, which, as already seen, is an
exception to the privity rule.
(5) Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages (1951, Ohio),
102 N.E.2d 281, is a trial court decision. Plaintiff, a household employe, was illjured whell a bottlc of alc she was removing from a carton, exploded. The court reviewed various
theories of recovery and concludell, among other things, that
(p.289 [5]), a bottle of ale containing pressure which causes
it to explode upon ordinary handling is a dangerous instrumentality and not of mer~hantable quality, its sale is a
breach of warranty and also negligence under Ohio law for
\yhieh action lies in either warranty or negligence, and liability in either event extends to a member of the purchaser's
household, including servants.
Thus, none of these five cases provides clear support for the
general proposition for which they were cited: that privity
is not required where the item sold is inherently dangerous.
Xor do other appellate conrt ('ases r('lied upon by plaintiff
seem to do so: Um'ted States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of
Waco (1937),130 Tex. 126 [108 S.W.2d 432]. and 1Ilannsz v .
.llacU'hyte Co. (1946), 155 F.2d 445, 449, both involved express warranties direct to the commmer, and Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Lyons (1927),145 Miss. 876 [111 So. 305],
was a situation of glass in a bottle of beverage and so comes
within the food cases. DiY ello v. Gardner Maclu'ne Co. (1951,
Ohio), 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 [10], is another Ohio trial court
opinion j it does, however, hola specifically that the sale of a
"grinding wheel carried with it an implied warranty of
merchantability and fit for the usagl's designed and that such
warranty extended to the workmen of the vendee who Waf;
injured in its ordinary use because of a latent defect . . . "
But as suggested by Professor Pross('r (Torts, 2d ed., p. 510,
n. 49) the DiVello case was perhaps overruled hy Wood v.
General Electric Co. (1953), 190 Ohio St. 273 [112 N.E.2d
8, 11-12 [3, 4]], in which the Ohio supreme C011l't held that
because of 1<1("k of privity the eOIlSUIlW!' ('ould not n'('over
against the manul'adurer 011 all impli(,ll warranty of fitness
where an all('gedly d('feetive ('led!'ie l)lanket I'l'sulted in
plaintiff's residen('e catehillg fire. (C,f. however, Rog('rs v.
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Toni IIolJle PC/'III(/II(I1/ Co. (]~j8), ]67 Ohio St. ~44 [147
N.E.2u 612, 616 14-. ;; 11; J/rl."k()/'ic/t v. J[rJ(rssvlI (e: RobiJillS,
Inc. (1968), lOG Ohio App. ~6;; [14!J N.E.2(1 181. lS,];
A1'!OIlS v. E. I. DlIl'ol!1 Dc .'iC)I!OIlJ'S (e- Co. (1!J,i8, C.C.A. ~),
261 F.2u 434, 436; which suggest a possible (lispo,,;ition by
Ohio to relax the privity rule, although any such relaxation
may be intendl'u to appl~- only in cases of advertising by
label, tradename, ete., as disC'llsscd in RIOT Y. S!Jrncin Williams (1945), supra, 42 Ca1.2d 682, 6a6 [19],) .And the other
case cited by plaintiff, Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas .il1a.son Co.
(1946), 67 F.Supp, 75], also a trial eonrt dccision, involved
additional factors whil'h make it not pC'rsuasivc here. The
same may be said of other cases citcd by both parties, some
of which turn on the ('xC'C'ptiOllS relating to foodstuffs and to
advertising or labels dirC'cted to the ultimate C'onsumer.
[la] Plaintiff empha<;izl's. however, that the grinding
wheel here involved was manufadul'C'd, sold, and pnrehase(l,
to be used on a power driven, high speed, rotating motor;
that it was known by defendant manufadurC'r to he dang'C'rous
if defectively made or if operated at speeds beyond its maximum capabilities (which were not markC'n on it), and that its
ingredients were secret and known only to defendant. Therefore, says plaintiff, it was a dangerous instrumentality if containing latent defects or if improperly llseil., and in view of
modern industrial usage employes should be considered a
member of the innustrial "family" of the employer-whether
corporate or private-and to thus stand in such privity to
the manufacturer as to permit the employes to be cOYerC'd hy
warranties made to the purchaser-employer.
We are pcrsuaded that this position is meritorious. [2] In
the first place, it is a matter of common knowledge, and of
course known to vendor-manufacturers, that most busines::;es
are carried on by means of the assistance of employes an<1
that equipment or supplies purchascd by employers will ill
actual use be handled by the employes, who in this respect
may be said to stand in the shoes of the employer. [3] Moreover the term "privity" itself appears to be of ullccrtain
origin and meaning and to have heen developed by the courts
and applied in various contexts. (See Klein v, Duchess SawlwichCo., Ltd. (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d 272, 276-283 [2, 3] ;
4 Corbin on Contracts, § 778; 33 'Words and PhrasC's 799-822.)
One of the customary definitions is that "privity" denotes
mutual or successive relationship to the same thing or right
of property; it impliC's sllccession. (8C'e eases collC'etC'd in

[:i-l C.2tl

;1:3 \runts and Phrases 810·8:20.) [lb] Thlls, in the present
t'olllt'xt, tl)(' employe had the SlIccl'ssiw right to the possession
and nse of the grinding wheL'1 handed OWl' to him by his
purchaser'l'lllp]oYl'r, and, wc bl'lievc, should fairly be considered to il(' in privity to the vendor·lllallufadurer with respect to the implied warranties of fitness for use and of merchantable quality upon whidl reeovcr~' is here sought.
Amici curiae supporting defendant urge, however, that
section 1735 of the Civil Code,3 enacted in 1931, has been
consistently interpreted by the courts in a manner opposed
to plaintiff's position and eontcntions, and that failure of the
Legislature to alter the previous judicial interpretation is
indicative of legislative intent. (See Colc v. Rush (1955) ,
45 Ca1.2d 345, 355 [8-9] [289 P .2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137).)
However, as shown hereinaboY(" interpretation by California
courts has not been as clear cut as amici curiae contend, and,
further, thc foodstuffs exception has been court developed in
the interim. (J(lcin v. Duchcss Sandu'ich Co., Ltd. (1939),
su.pra, 14 Ca1.2d 272, 276-283 [2, 3J.)
Negligence Count
Plaintiff further Ul'ges that the trial court erred in giving
a certain instruction proposed by defendant on the negligence
count on w'hieh trial was had. This instruction followed
plaintiff's instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Although plaintiff does not point out any erroneous statement
of law contained in the instruction of which he complains, he
asserts generally that it was confusing, wordy, misleading, too
hroad, and incomprehensible to an inexpert group of jurors,
gave undue prominence to the issue of overcoming the inference of neglect described in the standard res ipsa loquitur
instructions, and nullified the effect of such prior instructions.
Inasmuch as the lengthy instruction involved is the only instruction included in the record, no useful purpose wonld be
served by setting it forth. [4] It is elementary that instructions are to be considered as a whole (see Coggins v.
Hanchctte (1959), 52 Ca1.2d 67, 75 [3] [338 P.2d 379] ; 48
Cal.Jur.2d, 196-197, § 164), and in the absence from the
record of the other instructions an appellate court is in no
position to say that the particular instruction complained of
was or was not pr<.>judicial.
[5] Finally, plaintiff complains that the trial court erred
in excluding evidence as to plaintiff's state of mind with
'Ree footnote 1,

.~"pra,

p. 341.
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reference to whether or not he reasollably bclicVt'u that he was
wearing safety glasses at the time of the accident. Derenuant
pleadeu contributory negligence of plaintiff as a uefellse to the
negligence count, and the exclusion of evidence to which plaintiff rcfers occurred during the examination of the witness
Swerdfiger, who was a supcrintenucnt for plaintiff's employer, as follows:
"Q. By MR. CENTER [plaintiff's attorney] : Isn't it a fact
that Mr. Peterson when he came to work in your division
did come in to you with the glasses that he was wearing', that
you and he did look at them to determine wh('ther you thought
they were safety glasses 1 A. Not at the time of hire. Mr.
Peterson was hired before I was superintendent of the company.
"Q. Maybe it was at the time you becamc snperintendent
. . . A. Sometime in that period of time prior to the accident, yes.
"Q. Didn't you agree with Mr. Peterson that they looked
like safety glasses to you?"
The witness was not permitted to answer the last question,
on objections that he was not qualified regarding glasses, no
proper foundation had been laid, whether they looked like
safety glasses to the witness or not would be immaterial to
the issue of contributory negligence, and that his opinion
would tend neither to prove nor to disproye such issue.
Plaintiff had previously becn permitted, oyer defendant's
objection, to testify that the glasses he was wearing at the
time of the accident and which he had secured from the Navy
were safety glasses "to the bcst of my knowledge," and to
give the reasons for that belief. Since any testimony of Swerdtiger concerning a conYersation bet"'ecn plaintiff and himself
regarding the appcarance of plaintiff's glasses would have
been only cumulative evidence, its rejection under the circumstances does not appear to be prejudicial.
Stlfficicncy of Evidence
In conclusion it may be mentioned that defendant argucs
that at the trial on the negligence count plaintiff failed to
establish that the wheel whi(,h broke was one of those sold to
his employer hy this defendant, and that therefore plaintiff
is not in a position to urge a rewrsal on any of the threr
contentions which he advanees 011 appral. Plaintiff, without
supporting references to the record. asserts thcre was eVldencl!tracing the course of the whcel from the time of its purchase
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from defendant until it came to the burr bench at which
plaintiff worked, and went to pieces when first used. However,
since plaintiff's contention with respect to the demurrer to his
cause of action based on implied warranty must be determined
as a matter of law on the pleading without reference. to evidence, and since his two contentions as to alleged error occurring at the trial on the negligence count have been determined adversely to him on other grounds, we need not reach
defendant's assertions as to insufficiency of the evidence to
establish its connection with the allegedly defective wheel.
The judgment is: (1) affirmed with respect to the first
count, based on negligence; (2) reversed with respect to the
second, or warranty, count; and (3) the cause is remanded to
the superior court with directions to permit defendant (within
such reasonable time as that court may fix) to file an answer
or such other pleading or pleadings as defendant may elect.

1

Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Dooling, J., and Duni.
way, J. pro tern.,· concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment for the reasons
set forth in my concurring opinions in EscoZa v. Ooca Oola .
Bottling 00., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-468 [150 P.2d 436] and
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing 00., 33 Cal.2d 514, 523-533 [203
P.2d 522].
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. CAROLE ANNTREGOFF PAPPA, Petitioner,v~ SU.-----~':'-~
PERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et a1.,
Respondents.
[1] Judges-Disqualiiication-Prejudice.-Under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.6, subd. (3), providing that "only one motion [for peremptory challenge of a judge for prejudice] for each side may
be made in anyone action," where one defendant disqualified
one judge, the trial before a second judge resulted in a mistrial, and the case was then set for trial before a third judge
whom a codefendant wished to challenge, the first defendant's
motion to challenge such judge must be considered as baving

[1] See Cal.Jur~2d, Judges, §§ 27, 41; Am.Jur., Judges, §§ 89,
169 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-6,8-10] Judges, § 46; [7] Judges, § 60.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

